Generally, corporate managerial powers which, among others, entail powers to manage the company as a going concern, to exercise good faith and to act within powers are devolved to the corporate management. The corporate board may be negatively or positively active in the exercise of its powers. For third parties, the law made adequate protection for third parties which shield them from harm of agency problems. But the same cannot be said of the company. In certain cases where the board is positively active, this may unwittingly result in Longe Effect. Where the company suffers due to managerial slack it is the minority that bears the brunt. The enlightened shareholder value precept, albeit still evolving, can address these risks.
meeting are exercisable in restricted cases. Those restricted cases include where the directors are disqualified 12 , or where the board is deadlocked so that its meetings are inquorate 13 , making it impracticable for the conduct of the company's business 14 . Equally, the members will be entitled to exercise managerial powers of the company where the members in general meeting by the instrument of ordinary resolution dismisses the entire board 15 . In Nigeria, for example, a director will be disqualified where he fails to meet the requirement of share qualification after the lapse of two months from the date of his appointment 16 or where he is convicted of an offence involving fraud 17 . In the UK, the court may make a disqualification order against a director where it appears to it that he has been persistently in default in relation to any requirement as to return, account or other document to be filed with, delivered or sent, or notice of any matter to be given, to the registrar of companies 18 . Thus, the courts attach particular importance "to failure by directors to file annual returns, produce audited accounts and to keep proper accounting records" 19 . Infractions such as these may constitute "ingredients in a finding of unfitness" 20 for disqualification of a director 21 .
On the other hand, to the corporate board are donated managerial powers of the company. 22 This has been interpreted to mean that "the directors either manage the company themselves or, as in larger corporations, monitor employee executives" of which the CEO is the foremost among such employee executives. 23 That is, the Board would normally delegate its powers to the executive management, headed by the managing director or CEO, who will oversee the day to day affairs and activities of the company. Accordingly, the board of directors may from time to time appoint one or more of their body to the office of the managing director and may delegate all or any of their powers to such managing director 24 (Italics mine). In what strikes at the foundation of executive management as an organ of the company, the Nigerian Supreme Court had held that there was no provision for appointment of executive director under the law. Taking all relevant circumstances does this holding line up with intendment of the law? 25 From the foregoing, there is no doubt that too much power is concentrated in the corporate management of the Company 26 . Considering that world class companies continue to totter and subsequently implode despite having a sound system of corporate governance 27 , it becomes necessary to any analyse the connection between the wide powers of management and managerial slack. That is, to what extent do the wide powers feed or discourage managerial slack? Managerial slack is defined as lapses in managerial competence or effort, managerial entrenchment or empire building, and excessive managerial compensation consumption. 28 In undertaking this task, this Paper is divided into four parts -part I considers the managerial powers of the company; part II looks at the safeguards for securing effective exercise of corporate powers; part III considers legal remedies for abuse of corporate managerial powers. In conclusion (Part IV) the view is taken that corporate managers with enormous powers to their kitty have little motivation to pursue and promote the best interests of the company.
Managerial powers of the company
This is exercised by the corporate board and, at its pleasure, the executive management. The Board is a creation of the law. But the executive management can rightly be said to be a creation of the board that appoint them to, and superintend them as they, manage the day to day activities of the company. Nigeria, like the UK, operates unitary board structure. This is unlike the German jurisdiction that runs on two-tier board structure, "consisting of a managerial or executive board and a supervisory board which plays an important role in ensuring work-participation, or 'co-determination' in German companies" 29 (Emphasis added). The exercise of corporate managerial powers involves four-step broad decision making process steps:
1. initiation -generation of proposals for resource utilization and structure of contracts; 2. ratification -choice of decision initiatives to be implemented; 3. implementationexecution of ratified decision; and 4. monitoring -measurement of the performance of decision agents and implementation of rewards.
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Initiation and implementation constitute "decision management" and are allocated to the same agents (in this case, the executive management); while ratification and monitoring which constitute "decision control" are undertaken by board of directors. In other words, the board of directors are responsible for ratifying decisions and monitoring the outcome of such decisions as initiated and implemented by executive management. This should be the case in modern open (public) companies where "the decision managers who initiate and implement important decisions are not the major residual claimants and therefore do not bear a major share of the wealth effects of their decisions" 31 .
Where decision management and control is located in the same organ, residual claimants will have little protection, if any, against opportunism or misbehaviour of decision managers. It is outside the scope of this paper to examine in detail the activities involved in each process. For instance, to initiate a decision, the management will have to consider the past, the present and the future. 32 It is now sought to examine how the two-arm corporate management discharge its statutorily assigned managerial roles.
The Corporate Board (Board of Directors)
A director includes any person occupying the position of a director, by whatever name called, and includes a 'shadow director' being a person in accordance with whose directions or instructions the directors of the company are accustomed to act. 33 Directors are the persons to whom management of a company is entrusted 34 , and represent the highest level of management. 35 Collectively the directors are referred to as a board. To achieve the decision control roles of the board, the directors would have to "comprise of diverse group of experienced and talented individuals, all of whom would practice the characteristics and values of good commercial senses, courage, openness and integrity" 36 . Subject to the articles or statutory provision, the board have a duty to manage the business in the interest of the company and thus generates the drive on which the growth of individual companies and indeed of the economy as a whole depends. Since corporate strategy, vision and direction constitute the directors' core responsibilities to the company, the board points to the future of the company 37 . Hence, the primary role of the board is to exercise their powers in the interest of the company. 38 It does this by properly articulating the goals, and by deploying the assets, of the company to achieve the goals. The goals constitute the basis on which "major plans and policies having corporation-wide significance are approved by the board". 39 For example, annual budgets of companies are subject to board approval (ratification) before they can be implemented by the executive management. To complete the decision control cycle, boards must continuously review (monitor) "operating results, executive performance, market and conditions, and the extent to which corporate objectives, and policies are succeeding." 40 Without effective delivery of the decision control function, it is doubtful how the board can "provide entrepreneurial leadership of the company within a framework of prudent and effective controls which enable risk to be assessed and managed" 41 (Emphasis added).
How does the board deliver on its mandate as the shareholders' representative? The board may be negatively or positively active in this regard. Where the board is negatively active, it could be that there is unholy alliance between the board and executive to pillage and strip the company. Or it could occur through CEO board capture.
Or it may be a function of groupthink syndrome. Or it could result from insufficient technical knowledge (incompetence) on the part of the board members. Where the board is negatively active, the arm's length model of boards and their critical watchdog role becomes compromised. rarely found in board meetings". 42 With this state of affairs, the atmosphere at board meetings will be characteristically one of "courtesy, politeness and deference at the expense of truth and frankness..., reflecting a general reluctance of confronting a CEO regarding management decisions, which is seen as both a symptom and cause of failure in the control system". 43 Instead of acting as a bulwark against managerial opportunism, the board will gleefully turn a blind eye to clear cases of executive shirking.
Therefore, where the CEO succeeds in capturing the board, independence becomes compromised as collusion becomes business unusual as usual. Hence a board can be formally independent but functionally compromised. That is, one can be independent on paper but heavily compromised in reality. There are implications to this. Firstly, the parameters for fixing formal independence cannot be relied on 44 . Secondly, those parameters cannot promote functional independence. For instance, if a person adjudged to be independent solicits and accepts consulting or any other fee-paying engagement from the executive apart from his earnings as an independent director, his independence can be easily compromised. 45 Thirdly, board independence may not efficiently prevent managerial slack 46 .
Moreover, groupthink tendencies may also negatively impact on the role of the board because it makes "recourse to outside opinion less likely and would also be a barrier to creating a healthy degree of heterogeneity of opinions within the group" 47 (Emphasis added). Hence, collusion makes it possible for directors to be drenched in insider dealings 48 ; board capture gives the CEO 'right' to call the shorts as he 'buys' the conscience of even the independents on the board 49 and groupthink festers bandwagon and incompetence institutionalises shirking and makes it difficult for the board protect the interest of their appointors (shareholders) against the agency problems of the executive. 50 Most of these factors accounted for the fall of Enron, which informed the damning verdict that:
Enron's directors either did not know what was going on and should have, or the board knew and failed to stop it. The former would suggest that the board members were incompetent, the latter would implicate the board as an accessory to fraud. (...) Without a doubt, the directors failed to carry out their responsibilities to Enron's shareholders, employers, customers, and the wider community. 51 On the other hand, the board may be positively active. Here it means that the board has no reason to covet the good graces of management and will not hesitate to punish and remedy any case of misbehaviour 52 . It means that the board will have relevant information which it needs to be able to make a meaningful impact in the governance of companies, albeit chances exist that management may not be forthcoming with all the information or may be selective in giving out information. However, the board may be overly and unduly active in its bid to cure executive infraction. In Nigeria this could result in Longe Effect 53 in board function. 54 This is a case where the board justifiably insistent and determined on addressing and arresting managerial misbehaviour causes the company to suffer avoidable losses because of failure to comply with a statutory provision. In the case the CEO failed to exercise diligence in granting a facility to a customer which became bad. He was suspended and subsequently removed from office. The Court held that no matter how impugnable the action of the officer, bodies governed by Statute cannot be allowed to circumvent the applicability of a statutory provision 55 by first suspending a director without notice before removing him again without notice. The Court observed that the bank breached the law in its bid to punish managerial slack and thereby "brought about this unfortunate situation on itself... as what could have been done validly within three months has been made to last eight years" and at a high cost to the bank.
How can boards of Nigerian companies avoid the Longe Effect in their desire to curtail agency problems of executive management? Since provisions for entrenchment is not available in Nigeria
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, one of the ways to avoid the Longe Effect and still achieve justice for the company is to vest the power of removal in the chairman of the board. Thus, subject to ratification by the board, the chairman could be given the power to revoke the appointment of any executive director 57 , who is shown to have fallen short on rules and standards. This suggestion is fortified by the statutory provision that "where the memorandum or articles empower any person to appoint or remove any director or other officer of the company, such power shall be enforceable by that person notwithstanding that he is not a member or an officer of the company". 58 However, the company's articles must specifically empower the chairman; else any authorisation of the chairman by the board will be of no effect. This condition should form one of the contractual terms in the contract between the executive officer and the company.
At this juncture it is important to enquire, why should the law donate enormous powers to the board of directors? There are three grounds for this. The first is the fact that in a public company where the members are diffuse and disparate, it is not feasible for all the stock owners to be involved in the details of management. In any case, having money to invest does not equate having technical expertise to manage the investment. The era of classical entrepreneurial view of the company is gone. Thus, following industrialisation and advancements in science and technology the diversity and technical intricacy of industry means a much greater reliance on expert managers rather than the merely wealthy entrepreneurs, so that professionals were appointed to corporate management cadre.
The second reason is that the board is conceived and set up as a disinterested organ which can impartially moderate the tensions between minority and majority shareholders 59 and between shareholders as a whole and executive management with other stakeholders. 60 That is, the board is seen as the only body that can effectively deal with the basic agency problem between the firm's owners and its managers 61 , and also act as: useful instrument for dealing with the two other basic agency problems that face a business corporation: the prospect that the majority or controlling shareholders will behave opportunistically toward non-controlling (minority) shareholders, and the prospect that the firm or its owners will act opportunistically toward other parties with whom it transacts, such as creditors and employees. From discussions thus far it is hard to state categorically that the board has been efficient in mediating between the majority and minority shareholders and between the executive management and other parties that come to deal with the company.
The third ground for vesting enormous power in the corporate management is based on the trust proposition founded on stewardship model 63 . This basis holds that man is trustworthy, able to act in good faith in the interest of others with integrity and honesty 64 . Thus, company law is only reinforcing the trust proposition to the effect that men (such as the board of directors) in responsible positions must be trusted until there is reason to distrust them 65 . On this Lord Halsbury LC reminded us that "the business of life could not go on if people could not trust those who are put into a position of trust for the express purpose of attending to details of management" 66 . However, the risen focus of regulators in governance of firms means that the reason to distrust has become the rule than the exception. 
The Executive Management (headed by the CEO)
The executive management is in charge of decision management in the company. The role and position of executive management is only of interest in public companies where the members are large dispersed and disparate because in a private company "where the manager is also the firm's sole security holder 68 ... there is clearly no incentive problem" 69 . Bratton identifies three essential aspects of executive management's power: First, management groups determine the processes of production and distribution. Second, management groups dominate enormous hierarchical bureaucracies and exercise authority over all of those lower in the hierarchy. Third, managementdominated corporate entities impose externalities on those outside the entities.
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No doubt, delegating decision management function to the executive management is a wise one because separation and diffusion of decision management and decision control limits the power of individual decision agents to expropriate the interests of residual claimants. It also allows valuable knowledge and expertise to be unleashed on the governance of the company, enabling the company to function more effectively through efficient organisation of subordinated factors of production.
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But there are costs of managerial control. Thus, being the managers rather of other people's resources than of their own, they "cannot well be expected that they should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with which the partners of a private copartnery frequently watch over their own." 72 Possessing expertise in organizing resources puts the managers in a position of enormous power with wide discretion. This increases the temptation to feed on innate human greed and it has been observed that the avenues through which to express greed continue to expand enormously. 73 Thus instead of conducting the business with the view to promoting the interest of the company, the managers preoccupy themselves with pursuing self-interest goals and implementing self-perpetuating oligarchic goals. Secondly, it has been charged, as a cost of managerialism, that management exercises enormous power without commensurate accountability. Insisting on this, Bratton argues that:
First, legal doctrine vests governing power of the corporate entity in the board of directors subject to shareholder vote. Second, management in fact controls the board. Third, the financial community supports management. Ordinarily, hierarchical partitioning of corporate decision making process should act as disincentive to engage in actions that benefit the decision agents and hurt the residual claimants. But this is not always the outcome. For instance when the CEO succeeds in capturing the board, control of the company is automatically transferred to the managers. This avails the CEO with enormous powers to engage in activities which may be detrimental to other stakeholders. In Nigeria this was the experience of the now defunct, Intercontinental Bank plc, whose former CEO was also the Vice Chairman of the Board. He amassed so much power and influence that it did not come as a surprise when the bank imploded during the 2009 banking crises in Nigeria. 75 Also, in another case, the CEO of a bank was so powerful that she unilaterally approved and disbursed a loan application which the board of directors at duly constituted meetings had declined on several occasions. 76 The head of the executive management is the managing director (CEO) 77 , to whom the board may delegate all or any of its powers. 78 She is supported by executive directors. In Nigeria, the executive director is "an employee of the company whose status has been raised to that of a director but who continues essentially as such employee"
79 . Her employment is normally contractual, the terms of which may be fixed by the articles and complemented by a separate service or employment contract. 80 An executive director is a member of the board and can exercise corporate managerial power 81 as far the day to day running of the business is concerned. The Nigerian Supreme Court had held that there is no provision for the appointment of executive directors under the Nigerian company law 82 . With great respect and considering the surrounding circumstances, this view deserves further analysis.
Thus attention must be drawn to section 64(b) CAMA 2004 which provides that the board of directors may from time to time appoint one "or more of their body" to the office of managing director and may delegate all or any of their powers to such managing director (Italics mine). Now by the use of the phrase "or more of their body", can it be inferred that the board of directors may appoint several directors to the office of the managing director, so that we can have two, three or more managing directors in a company? That will be preposterous. The Nigerian law drew heavily from the English Companies Act 1985. For instance there is a simile provision in TABLE A to the Companies Act 1985 which states that:
The directors may appoint one or more of their number to the office of managing director or to any other executive office under the company and may enter into an agreement or arrangement with any director for his employment by the company or for the provision by him of any services outside the scope of the ordinary duties of a director. Any such appointment, agreement or arrangement may be made upon such terms as the directors determine and they may remunerate any such director for his services as they think fit. Any appointment of a director to an executive office shall terminate if he ceases to be a director but without prejudice to any claim to damages for breach of the contract of service between the director and the company. A managing director and a director holding any other executive office shall not be subject to retirement by rotation. One, the law in defining a director provided that third parties dealing with the company are entitled to presume that all persons who are described by the company as directors, whether as executive or otherwise, have been duly appointed 84 (Italics mine). Two, the law specifically provided that equal standard of care attach to both executive and non-executive directors, and qualifying same with the proviso that additional liability and benefit may arise under the master and servant law in the case of an executive director if there is an express or implied contract to that effect. 85 Express contract as contained in a separate contract of employment or the articles by virtue of his employment as an employee of the company. Implied by virtue of master and servant relationship, terms are implied into the contract of employment as a matter of custom, common or statute law. For instance, there is implied in the contract of employment of every employee a term that he will not disclose the trade secrets and confidential information of his employer, so that an executive director is caught by this liability 86 . This implied term continues after the cessation of employment 87 . Also, custom or practice, if shown to be notorious and its existence known to the executive director, may be implied into a contract of employment 88 . The implication of all these is that except the courts become purposive in construing the relevant section of the law, there is need for further legislative work to reflect the true legislative intent.
The Extent of Corporate Management Powers
The principle of devolution of power in the corporation is aimed at achieving a separation of ownership from control, so that the directors acting within their powers can, and do, take decisions against the wishes of the members 89 . Despite this fact, it should be noted that members have residual managerial powers and are to that extent to interfere 90 in the management of companies. In the exercise of their managerial powers, it has been emphasized that directors who are careful to take decisions which in their honest view is for the benefit of the company are not to be restrained because a majority shareholder or shareholders do not want the directors to so act. 91 What, then, does the managerial powers donated to board entail?
(i) It entails managing the company as a going concern 92 . This means that the company must be operating successfully, with a likelihood of continuing to remain so successful in the long term. Also, to manage it as a going concern does not entail a power to give bribes in order to secure business for the company 93 . Obviously too, it does not entail power to accept bribes, gifts or commission either in cash or kind from any person or to share in the profit of that person in respect of any transaction involving the company 94 . Shockingly, it has been found that Nigerian banks engage in profuse corruption because it is positively correlated to profitability 95 . What an awkwardly anomalous situation! Still on the going concern basis, corporate management lacks the standing or power to petition for winding up 96 . This is because allowing them to do so would destroy the basis of their managerial power. (ii) It entails exercise of power subject to the Articles. This means that members can reserve the right to veto certain matters. In Salmon v Quin & Axtens Ltd (supra) the articles of the company conferred a general power of management on the directors; while Article 80 made director's decisions on certain matters subject to the veto of either of two named shareholders. These two named shareholders were also appointed directors and managing directors of the company by the articles. One of the named shareholders exercised the veto. The court held that an ordinary resolution of the members was ineffective to override the veto because it was an attempt to alter Article 80 by ordinary resolution instead of special resolution. Of course it is a fact that where the directors exercised their powers ultra vires the articles, the company will still be bound, except members are able to restrain them by action from doing so.
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(iii) It entails exercise of power in good faith and with due diligence. The directors are at all times under duty to exercise their power in good faith in the interest of the company as a whole. This duty includes the duty to disclose any wrongdoing by the director. 98 The good faith requirement underpins all directors' duties, including the exercise of power by corporate management. Accordingly in line with the good faith duty, the directors must exercise their power for the right purpose and not for a collateral purpose. The power must be exercised prudently; otherwise it will constitute a breach of duty.
(iv) It entails power to litigate. The power to litigate in the name of the company is within the province of the general powers of corporate management. It would appear that corporate management cannot be overruled when a decision is taken to litigate 99 , except under derivative suit. 100 Under permitted cases, this power is however revertible to the members, for example where the directors refuse or neglect to exercise the power 101 and a member sues derivatively.
Safeguards for securing effective exercise of managerial powers
Corporate managerial powers lie with the board which can cascade it to the executive management (headed by the managing director and other executive directors). The board retains decision control function while it donates decision management function to the executive. How the law secured unfettered exercise of the powers is the focus of this section. Hence this section will consider protection of third parties and protection of the company.
Protection of Third Parties
Generally, directors are bound to act within powers and may not act for any collateral purpose. This means that adverse exercise of power will amount to breach of duty and may expose the director to personal liability. 102 As between the company and third parties, what is the effect of directors (a) exercising the authority of the company where there is none to exercise or (b) exceeding the authority given to them under the law or by the articles?
(i) Total absence of authority
Previously, where a company lacks power to enter into any transaction, or where the directors are expressly prohibited from entering into any transaction (e.g., prohibition from borrowing), the company and the directors would be bound by the prohibition. Accordingly:
There can be no doubt that where there is an express prohibition against borrowing, it must be obeyed. There is also no doubt, that where there is not an express prohibition against borrowing in a case of a company, or a society constituted for special purposes, no borrowing can be permitted without express authority, unless it be properly incident to the course and conduct of the business for its proper business. From the above, direct lack of power will be disapplied where borrowing is properly incidental to the course and conduct of the business (like trading) of the borrower 104 . In other cases the borrowing would be ultra vires and thus void. However, that used to be the position.
The current position, with respect to company powers, is that a company shall not carry on any business not authorised by its memorandum and shall not exceed the powers conferred upon it by its memorandum or CAMA 2004. 105 Without more, cases such as the Blackburn Building Society v Cunliffe Brooks & Co (supra) will still remain relevant and on point. But this provision has not only been altered but has been largely watered down by the fact that no act of a company shall be invalid by reason of the fact that such act was not done for the furtherance of any of the authorised businesses of the company or that the company otherwise exceeded its powers. 106 In other words, the position is that there is nothing standing in the way of the company from entering into any transaction. This is a great relief to third parties who, without this provision, would have, to their own hurt, be left helplessly to bear all consequences of their error when they enter into a transaction with a company, which transaction was thereafter found to be ultra vires the company or its agents. In other words, third parties are protected to the fullest extent when they deal with the company, although, without their knowledge, the company or its agents lacked the requisite power to enter into the transaction in question.
(ii) Limitation of authority One of the commonest situations which may necessitate a director exceeding his powers has to do with borrowing powers of the company. Frequently, articles of association of companies are couched to limit the extent to which the directors may exercise the power of the company to borrow money. For instance, in one of the companies incorporated by this writer, Clause 6.0 of the Company's Articles provides with respect to the borrowing powers of the Company that:
The directors may exercise all the powers of the company to borrow money and to encumber its assets by way of security: PROVIDED that the board shall not exercise this power to borrow an amount equivalent to fifty percent of the share capital of the company without the approval first had and obtained of the shareholders holding not less than sixty five percent of the shares in the capital of the company.
The above provision only limits or restricts the powers of the board in respect of borrowing. It did not amount to total absence of power. This simply means that borrowing to the extent of 50% of the Company's authorised share capital is intra vires the directors. What if the directors purportedly exercised this power to borrow over and above the threshold? What will be the consequence of this action? Such a borrowing is clearly ultra vires the directors but intra vires the Company. 107 What is the effect of directors exceeding their powers? Orojo clarifies that:
The power to borrow money may be regulated by the articles and where the directors' borrowing powers are limited; they must keep within those powers and also within the objects and powers of the company. The effect of 'unlawful borrowing' depends on whether it is ultra vires the company or merely ultra vires the directors but intra vires the company. If the directors borrow money on debentures in excess of the power given in the articles, the debentures are void 108 , (but) since the act is not ultra vires the company it may be ratified.
(Emphasis added)
Generally, where the directors exceed their power with respect to any transaction, the law made provisions that shield innocent third parties from manifest harm. Thus it is the law that: no act of a company and no conveyance or transfer of property to or by a company shall be invalid by reason of the fact that such act, conveyance or transfer was not done or made for the furtherance of any of the authorised business of the company or that the company was otherwise exceeding its objects or powers.
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As for the company its only protection lays in restraining the directors by injunction from entering into the ultra vires transaction. 111 However, where the equities of an innocent third party have intervened, the company cannot avoid the transaction. In the circumstances, the directors who committed the ultra vires act will be personally liable to the company. It must be pointed out that the protection to the third party is not licence to imprudence on the part of the third party. Thus, it is wisdom to check the company's memorandum and articles for corporate power before entering into significant transaction, like a debt transaction. This can be done by conducting a search at the company's registry, or checking with the secretary. According to Fuller, conducting a search is the wise course to take because:
(a) even though the creditor may have the protection of s 35 112 , the directors who approve an ultra vires transaction may be liable to the company; (b) lack of corporate capacity limits the actual authority of the company's agents, and therefore the creditor is not fully protected unless the requirements in relation to authority are also satisfied; and there is the risk that the creditor, depending on his equity 113 , (c) may be required to hold any proceeds received under a transaction that is beyond the company's capacity as constructive trustee for the company. 114 As to (a) above, it means that, subject to the terms of his appointment or the provisions of law, the director may be removed from office, and this can adversely affect the creditor, albeit the company is liable on the transaction. Thus, if the creditor sues to recover, the company can comprise the suit by cross action against the erring directors in which the creditors are joined. Meanwhile the capital investment of the creditor is locked up in the company's system.
As to second (b) ambit of Fuller's statement, the requirements in relation to authority are very generous to third parties. In Nigeria any person having dealings with a company or with someone deriving title under the company are entitled to presume (and the company shall be estopped from denying its truth) that: every person described in the particulars filed with the Corporate Affairs Commission (Nigerian Companies Registry) as a director, managing director of the company or secretary of the company or represented by the company, acting through its members in general meeting or board of directors has been duly appointed and has authority to exercise the powers...
(Emphasis added)
The foregoing presumption adds force to earlier provision which makes acts of members in general meeting, the board of directors and the managing director the acts of the company. 116 The presumption creates agency by estoppel against the company in favour of a third party. To take effect, the company must have taken steps to represent the person to the whole world, and consequently held him out, as a director, albeit there may be defects in his appointment. Any act by the person will bind the company.
To take benefit of this presumption, the company must have made the representation, which produced a belief in the mind of the third party leading to the act of the third party. The representation may be by words (as in writing a letter identifying someone as a director) or conduct (as in placing a person in a position where she normally has authority to do a particular act). The representation may be intentional or negligent. Hence, it has been held that to presume representation and thus bind the company, three ingredients must be present:
Ostensible or apparent authority which negatives the existence of actual authority is merely a form of estoppel and a party cannot call in aid an estoppel unless three ingredients are present (1) representation, (2) a reliance on that representation and (3) an alteration of his position resulting from such reliance.
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Three further points need to be made with respect to representation. One, it has been held that representation by the company must convey the clear message that the ostensible director has been duly appointed and has authority to do a particular act on behalf of the company. 118 Secondly, the representation must be made to the person seeking to hold the company liable. This means that if the person relying on the presumption has never heard of the company any reliance on section 69 presumption will fail. 119 That is any reliance on the presumption must not be based on the belief that the apparent director has been duly appointed and has authority of the company to act. Three, the job title of the officer, corroborated by evidence of the usual authority of an officer with such a title would have in the kind of business of the company, could be the only evidence of holding out. 120 Moreover, the law made additional protections for third parties with respect to the validity of the acts of company agents. In this connection, the acts of a director, manager, or secretary shall be valid notwithstanding any defect that may afterwards be discovered in his appointment or qualification. 121 The UK regime 122 went a step further by validating the acts of such a director even if it was afterwards discovered that he had ceased to hold office or, was validly appointed but was not entitled to vote on the matter in question, and the protection still applies even if the resolution by which he was appointed is void under the law.
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At this point, it must be noted that there are limitations to the application of presumption in favour of third parties and there are limits to the liability of the company with respect to the authority of the directors to act on behalf of the company. In the first place it is important to note proviso (ii) to section 69 CAMA 2004 which states that: a person shall not be entitled to assume that any one or more of the directors of the company have been appointed to act as a committee of the board of directors or that an officer or agent of the company has the company's authority merely because the company's articles provided that authority to act in the matter may be delegated to a committee or to an officer or agent.
That is, the protections will not be available where the transaction is purportedly entered into by a committee or an officer or agent who was neither authorised by the board nor held out by the company. This is a caveat which third parties are expected to heed, after all ex abundante cautela. Equally, the presumption will not be satisfied if the third party had actual knowledge of absence of power at the time of the transaction in question 124 or there were circumstances putting her on inquiry, especially where she has a close commercial relationship with the company and consequently knows of, but deliberately chooses to turn blind eyes to, the absence of power or of the irregularity. 125 Also the binding effect of such transactions cannot scale through where the transaction was the offshoot of a board decision purportedly taken at an inquorate or improperly constituted board meeting. 126 In contrast, under the CA 2006 regime 127 where the other parties to the ultra vires transaction include a director of the company or its holding company or a person connected with such a director the protections are inapplicable. 128 Although no simile express provision obtains under CAMA 2004
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, it is submitted that it can be extensively construed to include such class of persons so that such a transaction can be rightly voidable at the instance of the company. Furthermore, the above provisions cannot be used as a cover to commit wrongdoing or perpetuate fraud on the company. Accordingly, the company will not be bound where there is collusion between the company's agent and the third party. 130 Where collusion is shown, the third ambit of Fuller's statement will apply to the effect that the third party "may be required to hold any proceeds received under a transaction that is beyond the company's capacity as constructive trustee for the company". But where no collusion is disclosed and the agent acted fraudulently with reference to the particular transaction, the liability of the company to the third party remains unaffected thereby. This is because the third party never knew of the fraud on the part of the agent and should not be made a scapegoat of the agent's fraud. Where the person was never appointed but rather she nominated herself, and proceeding on behalf of herself, represented herself to the outside world that she is duly appointed a director and has authority to act, in so far as the company did not hold her out in any way, any acts of such a person cannot bind the company 131 Fundamentally, an act that is ultra vires the company, may not affect the transaction concerned, but it will effectually limit the actual authority of the company's agents. This places a duty of diligence on a third party to satisfy herself that the requirements as to presumptions and authority of company agents together with the provisos thereof are met. No doubt company law made adequate protections for innocent third parties who may be dealing with the company. This is because that is the only basis third parties can be assured that the directors, not being owners of the business, are not suffering under any disability while going about their duties to the company. Also, it is in keeping with the trust proposition to the effect that men in responsible positions should be trusted until there is reason to distrust them.
Consequently, by making the company liable for all acts of directors, notwithstanding any defect in their appointment or the absence of authority, the law only seeks to perpetuate the doctrine of separate legal personality and thereby strike a bargain for third parties who deal with the company. 133 In other words, the law has succeeded in removing any uncertainty likely to be playing in the minds of third parties as to "whether the company has the capacity to enter into a transaction and whether the agent has the authority to bind it" 134 with respect to the transaction in question. Without doubt, the law achieved equity for the third party. What about the company, one would enquire?
Protection of the Company
So far, it has been seen that corporate managerial powers devolved to the board on the supposition that they should be trusted until the reason to distrust them ensues. But this is idealistic, because corporate management rarely serve the interests of the company. Rather they preoccupy themselves with unbridled commission of managerial slack. Intent on guarding against this, the law made provisions for the protection of the company. To achieve protection for the company, the law uses a mixture of rules and standards to guard against managerial misbehaviour. Cahn and Donald brought out a fine distinction between standards and rules:
A "standard of conduct" prescribes how a person should act or fulfil a function or task, and it operates as an open-ended measure against which the quality of performance can be assessed ex post. A "rule", by contrast, names something specific that the management must do or not do. Standards flexibly adapt to acts and procedures that are not foreseen in their entirety when the standard is written, but standards can also create legal risks for directors because the scope of their requirement is often difficult to foresee. Rules, on the other hand, offer bright lines that are easy to apply, but for the same reason they can also be easy to evade -give that their parameters are clear and inflexible -unless they are arranged with sufficiently contiguous density, and often fail to account for changing circumstances.
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Thus, standards of behaviour allow sufficient discretion to directors to exercise their powers and take necessary risks. But standards protect the interest of members as a whole where the directors embark on actions which feather their nest. Examples of standards include duty of skill and care, fiduciary obligations (duty of loyalty) and conflict of interests duties. Conversely, rules are prophylactic in that they are set up in advance to address and reduce situations in which a director has high probability of committing infractions as he goes about observing the standards. That is, rules cover all of the situations in which conflicts of interest normally arise. Examples of rules which are prophylactic in nature include the statutory provision that the term of any service contract between a director and the company exceeding five years must be approved by the shareholders following full disclosure of the terms of the contract; 136 and a provision that a director shall not accept a bribe, a gift, or commission either in cash or kind from any person or a share in the profit of that person who had dealings with the company. 137 Generally, the standards are owed to the company. The interests of the shareholders as a whole represent the interest of the company. Of all the duties, fiduciary obligation is most basic and underpins all other duties. For instance, a director is expected to exercise duty of care and skill in his duties to the company. No degree of competence and reasonable care would meet the demands of this duty if the director is shown to have exercised this duty dishonestly or disloyally. This means that fiduciary duty is different from non-fiduciary duty. It equally 133 means that "a breach of fiduciary duty can occur without a breach of non-fiduciary duty." 138 For this reason only the codified fiduciary obligations of directors has been considered in this section. 139 
(i) Fiduciary obligations of directors 140
Fiduciary relationship is present where, in a relationship, one party enjoys discretionary power over the significant practical interest of another. It is characterised by the fact that "the fiduciary (e.g., a director) obtains power from the entrustor (e.g., members in general meeting) for the sole purpose of enabling the fiduciary to act effectively". 141 (Emphasis added) Thus, fiduciary obligation arises in any relationship in which one party is given discretionary power to affect the legal or vital practical interests of the other party. Thus a fiduciary is "a person who agrees, or undertakes, to act for, or on behalf of, or in the interests of, another person in the exercise of a power or of discretion which will affect the interests of that other person in a legal or practical sense" 142 . This means that there cannot be fiduciary obligation where the fiduciary lacks discretionary power. 143 The presence of discretionary power is a potential danger area as far self interest is concerned. This explains why a requirement to abstain from self-interest behaviour is a core element of fiduciary duties of directors. 144 In other words, fiduciary obligations performs protective function, for without it self-interest would lead the director in an entirely opposite direction as far as his duty to the company is concerned. Thus, self-interest is the "very evil" against which fiduciary obligation is directed. 145 One aspect of the fiduciary duties 146 of a director is the duty to observe utmost good faith towards the company in any transactions with or on behalf of the company 147 and to act in what he believes to be the best interest of the company as a whole 148 . In the discharge of this duty, the director must similarly have regard to the company's employees in general 149 . As a preliminary, the duty to act bona fide 150 in the interests of the company is owed to the company and not to individual shareholders. However, the duty can be owed to individual shareholders where the director acts as an agent of the shareholder 151 . On this, it has been held that once it can be shown that there was a special factual relationship between the directors and the shareholders in the particular case, fiduciary duties shall be owed to the shareholders 152 . It has been argued that the duty to have regard to the interest of members is "vague and the possibility of enforcement is remote, for the duty is owed by the directors to the company and the company alone" 153 . This is not so 154 . For instance, the duty is not owed to the company's creditors 155 , yet where the company is in the vicinity of insolvency, the directors become automatically bound to act bona fide in the interests of the creditors. 156 The means the creditor can successfully maintain an action for grounds that the affairs of the company are being conducted in an illegal or oppressive manner 157 .
How do we test the good faith conduct of the director? It is tested on commonsense principles and proceeds from the court asking itself whether it is proved that the directors have not done what they (the directors, not the court) honestly believed to be right. That is, the test is as to the director's state of mind 158 , a subjective test indeed. On faith business judgments to promote the success of the company". 170 Whatever the case, the provision keeps the directors on their toes, because it has succeeded in giving an insight into the factors or issues that would, or should, form the basis of the director's state of mind.
Remedies for abuse of corporate managerial powers
By devolving corporate managerial powers to the corporate management, the expectation is that the members in general meeting would be able to organise their affairs in such a way that confidence and trust can be reposed in the corporate board. This they can do by articulating their articles in such a way that chances for abuse of managerial power are curtailed. 171 That is why the law insists that the directors, acting within powers and subject to good faith and due diligence, can take decisions against the wishes of the members, and the members cannot control them in the exercise of these powers while they remain in office 172 . In any case where the board acted bona fide and with due diligence and the action amounted to disobedience of instructions or directions of members, the only sense that could be made of such a situation is that the members desired to procure the board to commit a wrongful or an unlawful act, since an act cannot be bona fide and mala fide at the same time.
However, the principal question is what if the directors act against clear provisions of the article so that their action in respect of a particular matter becomes ultra vires the directors but intra vires the company? Or what if the directors acting within powers chose deliberately to act mala fide? Considering that, generally speaking, the company is liable for the acts of its primary organs 173 on the basis that, as an artificial entity, the company is not capable of acting "in propria persona" but can only incur liability through its decision agents 174 what remedies are there for the company where the decision agents are steep in opportunism?
Restrain the Doing of the Ultra Vires Act
There are two ways by which managerial abuse of corporate powers can be checked. The first way to restrain corporate management from embarking on or continuing with acts ultra vires their powers is through the articles. In the UK this can be achieved through entrenched provisions in the articles 175 or by amending the articles. However, this is a weak remedy, because the members in general meeting can be subject to manipulation by the directors through proxy machinery exacerbated by unhealthy shareholder passivity in Nigeria. 176 Except the articles contained restrictions on managerial powers ex ante, this remedy, ex post excess of power, is attempting to lock the stable door after the horse had bolted out since no alteration of the articles shall invalidate any prior wrongful act of the directors. 177 Even if it is so, the case of the company is not helped, since acts ultra vires the directors do not relieve the company of liability to third parties. Thus, if this is the only remedy available for restraining excess of power, the company would be the worse for it.
Secondly, the managers can be restrained by action from embarking on ultra vires transaction. This is achieved by application for prohibitive injunction against the doing of any act that would amount to the company exceeding its objects or powers. 178 The efficiency of this remedy is dependent on how adept members are in their monitoring role. The efficiency of the monitoring is subject to the amount of relevant information at members' disposal. Thus corporate management could exploit asymmetric information to ensure that infractions are not discovered before their occurrence. In any case members will rely on the board of directors who, too, may be victim of information asymmetry or may be weakened by CEO board capture or may be complicit in managerial slack.
Remove the Erring Member(s) of Corporate Management
In Nigeria, the law set up the shareholders as an interventionist and remedial device against opportunism. To this end, the shareholders can remove erring director(s) by ordinary resolution. It is not so easy in practice because the diffuse and disparate character of members make it difficult for them to co-ordinate effectively. 179 This is exacerbated by the nature of shareholding structure in Nigerian companies. For instance, as at 2009, 94,685 shareholders representing 75% of the shareholders held only 1.45% in the capital of Diamond Bank plc; whereas only two shareholders held 25% of the bank's shares. In Dangote Sugar Refinery plc 89,340 shareholders representing 81% of the shareholders held 1.76% of the company's shares, while 68% of the company's shares are held by one institution owned by the chairman of the company. Since those on board might be significant share-owning directors, this makes it near-impossible to remedy abuse of managerial powers by way of removal of the affected officer. Thus, when the company suffers over wrongful acts of directors it may actually be suffering of the minority.
Derivatively proceed against those in control
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Apart from restraining the directors or removing the errant director, members can bring an action against the officers where the acts had been completed. In most cases where the company through its officers exceeds its power, the motivation might be greed other than the interest of the company. This forecloses the room that those in control will sue to remedy the wrongful act. Except this course is pursued by a member(s), the company helplessly suffers the crass malfeasant acts of its managers. And many of such acts might have gone without remedy.
Conclusion
When the board is negatively active, the best interest of the company suffers because it will be neither promoted nor protected. When the interest of the company is mortgaged by reason of board's failure in its decision control function, the company suffers. But that is not completely true, since the interest of the company means the interest of the shareholders as a whole. Based on the principle of majority rule, it is likely that board appointments would be largely, if not completely, influenced by shareholders with significant holdings in the capital of the company. Even the presence of independents on the board is not necessarily an insurance against managerial slack since formal independence does not translate to functional independence and by extension board independence. Now where the board is negatively active only a segment or class in the company will bear the brunt of the board's opportunism. This will be the minority, who might have no say, or might not have their way, in influencing board appointments. Similarly, asymmetric information will ensure that the minority do not learn of managerial slack to be able to prevent or remedy it. Already, third parties are protected to the fullest extent, but this protection, for those whose interests are non-adjusting (e.g., unsecured creditors), becomes precariously endangered where the company slips into insolvency. The agenda should be to develop systems which synchronise the company with society because whenever a company fails it leaves multiplier effects on the society. 181 The UK regime has taken the plunge with the ESV precept. As the concept evolves, and is embraced by other regimes, it can only get better.
